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 I ABSTRACT
 
This experiment was conducted to investigate (a) the effect
 
of sex of subject and mode of moral dilemma story presenta
 
tion on the empathy of subjects toward the characters in
 
the stories, and (b) the relationship between empathy and
 
Kohlberg's moral judgment stages. Sixty-four high school
 
students (32 males and 32 females) were divided into two
 
groups matched on the jscores of an empathy questionnaire.
 
One group read two moral dilemma stories while the other
 
group was exposed to aj dramatized tape-recorded version
 
of the stories. A second empathy scale, related to the
 
moral dilemma stories,I was then.given to both groups. The
 
results indicate that i(a) females showed more empathy than
 
males, (b) sfubjects who heard the stories showed more
 
empathy than subjects who read the stories, and (c) moral
 
judgment stage is related to degree of empathy. The results
 
were interpreted as confirming the importance of the role
 
of empathy in moral judgment.
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 INTRODUCTION
 
Historical I Background of Problem
 
A brief historical overview of the concept of morality
 
will indicate the complex nature.of this subject. Prior to
 
the twentieth centuryj the subject of morality fell within
 
the field of philosophic ethics. Little, if any, scientific
 
research was carried put to determine the antecedents of
 
moral behavior. It wasn't until Freud's time that morality
 
became of research interest to the field of psychology.
 
Through many case studies such as "The Analysis of a Phobia
 
in a Five Year Old Boyi," Freud (1909) believed that the
 
acquisition of morality was internal; that is, learned
 
through an agency in the child's personality which he
 
called the superego ank was responsible for issuing declara
 
tions of the "thou shait" and "thou shalt not" variety.
 
Freud emphasized feelings of guilt imposed by the superego
 
as a controller in the!moralization of the child. The way
 
in which the child acquired his/her morality was through a
 
process called identification with his/her parents. Most
 
. i ■ 
often, however, moralization would occur because of parental
 
displeasure or disapproval resulting in the feelings of the
 
child with a sense of shame or guilt. Thus, Freud's approach
 
was subjective and concentrated on the client's feelings to
 
explain moral judgments
 
  
 
 
In the late 1920s an objective approach in the
 
investigation of morality was undertaken by Hartshbrne
 
and May (1928-30). Tiiis was the monumental American study
 
called "The CharacteriEducation Inquiry" (CEI), Thousands
 
of children were used 1 in the investigation of moral knowl
 
edge and moral conduct. Moral conduct was studied by giving
 
children opportunities to lie, steal, and cheat in circum
 
stances such that they could believe themselves safe from
 
being discovered* Paper and pencil tests to ipfer moral
 
knowledge contained st|atements such as, "Good marks are
 
chiefly a matter of luck," which would be marked true or
 
false. ,A parallel study was conducted on moral opinion
 
in which statements suCh as, "It is your duty to report
 
another student if you!see him cheating," were answered
 
with true or false responses.
 
Hartshorne and May had anticipated that their study
 
would reveal a consistency of moral character. The results
 
of the CEI were most surprising. They showed a marked
 
specificity of moral behavior. Correlations between one
 
, i / ■ ' , ■ . . ■ 
experimental setting anjd another were low. For example,
 
i , ■ ■ ■ ' ' ■ 
the child that cheated on an arithmetic test as often as
 
not failed to cheat on a spelling test. In the final analy
 
sis of some 11,000 chilidren, the results revealed little
 
, ! 
i ■ ■ ■ 
correlation between morkl knowledge and moral conduct and,
 
further, that moral conduct was a function of the situation
 
instead of the generalized morality that was hypothesized.
 
  
 
 
 
 
At about the samje time of the CEI and in contrast to
 
the Hartshorne and May study, Piaget, (1932) investigated
 
1 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
morality in children With respect to the forms of under­
, . . . j . ■ " ' ■ ■ , 
standing moral knowledge, a cognitive approach. To
 
investigate their understanding of'moral concepts, Piaget
 
described two story situations and asked the children to
 
determine which of the! two described the "naughtier" action.
 
The test stories differed only in the moral intentions of
 
the characters in the stories and the amount or size of
 
resulting damage. The|results of the children's answers
 
revealed two moralities for Piaget, which he labeled
 
heteronomous, meaning "subject to another's law" and
 
autonomous, meaning "svjibject to one's own law." For
 
excunple, in the test stories involving the characters'
 
moral actions, children of eight years old and younger
 
. i ' ■ ' ■ ' ■ 
thought the subject in [the first story to be the "naughtier"
 
child for the reason that she had done the greater damage;
 
the child's moral conception is bbjective and absolute and
 
conduct is ruled by adult authority. Older children, above
 
eight years, thought th^ subject in the second story to be
 
the "naughtier" because her intentions were not as good as
 
I ■ ■ . . ■ r 
the subject in the first story; the older child's moral
 
I • • ' ' ■ ■ ■ 
conception is subjective! and relative and conduct is ruled
 
I ■ . 
by mutual group agreement.
 
A number of studies! have substantiated Piaget's theory
 
i
 
of a two-step moral development. Nearly 40 years after
 
Piaget's initial research, Buchanan (1973) conducted an
 
experiment very similar to Piaget's, except that Buchanan
 
incorporated in his procedure the opportunity for the sub
 
jects to weigh damage and intent simultaneously when making
 
a moral judgment. He asked 48 siX-to-ten year olds to make
 
moral judgments about characters in stories when levels of
 
damage and intent differed systematically. The results of
 
this study supports Piaget's earlier findings that damage
 
was more important for younger children and that intent
 
was more important for older children.
 
Due to the disappointing results of the CEI of 1930,
 
the subject of morality fell into a period of quiescence
 
until the late 1950s when Kohlberg (1958) began to investi
 
gate a cognitive-developmental approach to the raoralization
 
of the child. Kohlberg's view was an elaboration of
 
Piaget's position, holding that moral knowledge develops in
 
stages and sequences in a hierarchical order.
 
Kohlberg asked children to judge the morality of con
 
duct reflected in stories which he invented. The children's
 
aniswers were evaluated by a number of judges from their
 
subjective reports and quantified into scores. At the time
 
of the 1958 paper, there were six stages composed of 23
 
aspects of moral judgment. The results of these early
 
studies confirmed Kohlberg's belief that children learn
 
morality in sequential stages. His cognitive-developmental
 
theory suggests that moral reasoning in the child is
 
 developed according to structural changes occurring with
 
cognitive reorganizations; that is, thinking and reasoning
 
abilities about rules and regulations. These structural
 
changes in thinking and reasoning are brought about by
 
changes in "cognitive maps" as proposed in Tolman•s sign
 
learning theory (Hilgard & Bower, 1966), "The learner is
 
following signs to a goal, is learning his way about, is
 
following a sort of map—in other words, is learning not
 
movements, but meanings" (p, 195),
 
Although Kohlberg believed that meanings involve
 
motives and the affects, the development of the motives and
 
affects are subordinate to changes in thought patterns.
 
According to Kohlberg (1969), "Even the affect component of
 
attitudes is largely shaped by the cognitive organization
 
of these attitudes" (pp, 372-73),
 
The results of subsequent research by Kohlberg and
 
his followers have suggested that social behavior and
 
socialization should be defined in terms of developmental
 
( . • , ' ■ ■' ■ , , ■ ■ ■ 
sequence rather than static traits. 
Rest (1973) made a study to assess the comprehension 
and preference for Kohlberg's stages of moral development 
in 47 high school students. Subjects were asked to sum 
marize typical statements of Kohlberg's six stages and 
correct paraphrasing of the statement was used as evidence 
that subjects could comprehend'that stage of moral reason 
ing, Preference for each stage was measured by having the 
subjects rate and rank the prototypic statements. About
 
half of the subjects Showed comprehension of the Statements
 
at the stage of which they were assessed# although a
 
majority of students showed preference for a higher stage
 
statement. Rest's study tends to support Kohlberg's cog
 
nitive-developmental theory in that the subjects showed a
 
difficulty in understanding higher stages even though there
 
was a preference for the higher stages.
 
Brown (1965) studied socialization of morality and
 
devoted a chapter of his book# Acquisition of Morality#
 
to a critical analysis of moral learning. Brown's basic
 
disagreement with Kohlberg and Piaget is in their implica
 
tion that moral acquisition is primarily cognitive# involv
 
ing the formulation and restructuring of rules by the intel
 
lect. Brown also questions the developmental nature of
 
morality. Other investigators have indicated that a devel
 
opmental theory is unnecessary to account for a child's
 
level of morality. For example# modeling would be one way
 
in which the child has learned to make discriminations.
 
Schleifer and Douglas (1973) conducted an experiment in
 
which children shifted their moral orientation after rela
 
tively brief training periods indicating that the role-taking
 
process opposes a sthge and sequence explanation of moral
 
acquisition.
 
In Brown's review# he proposed that moralization of
 
the individual proceeds in three dimensions: knowledge#
 
conduct, and feeling. These three main parameters are
 
curtailed or enhanced by a number of learning principles
 
such as operant conditioning, imitation/modeling, cognitive
 
restructuring of experiences, and classical conditioning
 
of emotional responses, He cites an experiment conducted
 
by Bandura and McDonald (1963) in which they found "experi
 
mental treatments produced substantial changes in the
 
children's moral judgment responses. Conditions utilizing
 
modeling cues proved to be more effective than the operant
 
conditioning procedure" (p. 274).
 
Brown does not believe there is any order or prefer
 
ence to the dimensions of morality. The type of learning
 
a person utilizes at any given time would vary according
 
to the situation. He points out that for this reason, it
 
is not surprising to see why morality is so inconsistent
 
as shown by the results of the CEI, Brown believes that
 
moral knowledge and feeling are independent agencies in the
 
mind and they are acquired in quite different ways. He
 
believes that feeling is a major dimension of morality
 
because it is an internalization of the self. Feeling
 
guilty about lying and, conversely, feeling virtuous about
 
telling the truth are elements of the self-concept which
 
reflect the individual's value judgments just as much as
 
his intellectual understanding of the rules.
 
According to Brown, acquisition of moral knowledge,
 
conduct, and feeling may proceed at an uneven rate. If
 
 ■ ■ 8 
moralization is a matter of incorporating several kinds of
 
learning, depending on the moral dimension involved, then
 
inconsistent behavior is expected to occur. Moral conduct
 
would be situation-specific,
 
Hogan's (1973) paper re-evaluates morality and places
 
moral conduct and moral character in a new perspective. He
 
reasserts the belief that moral conduct can be explained
 
and that moral character can be described. Moral knowledge,
 
socialization, empathy, autonomy, and moral judgment are
 
the basic dimensions which would be required to adequately
 
explain moral conduct> he believes. These five concepts
 
were derived from previous experimentation in which he
 
investigated human behavior from a view of man as a rule-

formulating and rule-following animal. This is the first
 
attempt to include a dimension of the affect (empathy) in
 
the study of moral behavior.
 
Hogan's conclusions suggest that morality is the result
 
of a continuous task of adjusting internal conditions of
 
the organism to the external demands of the environment.
 
Hogan does not believe that moral behavior is learned in
 
step-wise fashion according to stages as proposed by Kohl-

berg, but that the variation in levels of moral character
 
result because of each person's unique character structure
 
developed according to rules of conduct of the situation
 
and his internal feeling level.
 
In a previous study by Hogan and Dickstein (1972),
 
they investigated the personological correlates of moral
 
judgment and found that persons whose moral judgments were
 
rated as mature tended to be sensitive to injustice, well
 
socialized, empathetic, autonomous, and they based their
 
judgments on an intuitive understanding of morality rather
 
than on a rational basis.
 
Tracy and Cross (1973) used Kohlberg's interview
 
techniques for moral stages and matched 76 seventh graders.
 
One group received no treatment while the experimental
 
group was exposed to moral reasoning one stage above their
 
initial level. Posttesting showed no difference in the
 
control group, but showed a significant difference in the
 
experimental group. The parameters tested were social
 
desirability, role-taking, intelligence, stage mixture, and
 
socioeconomic status. Only social desirability was asso
 
ciated with a change in moral stages. This study supports
 
the notion that affect might be as influential as cognition
 
in moral development.
 
Although Aronfreed (1969) believes that the specific
 
quality of an affective state is determined by its cognitive
 
(housing), he emphasizes the importance of the affective
 
State in the social development of the child. He says,
 
"The establishment of empathic and vicarious dispositions
 
may be thought of as a kind of internalization process
 
since it enables the child's behavior to become somewhat
 
independent of the control of its direct experience of
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social reward and punishment" (p. 293).
 
Since socialization practices include functions of
 
role-taking with a dimension of empathic feelings, it would
 
appear that empathy could be a major determinant of a per
 
son's morality. '
 
Statement of the Problem
 
The purpose of the preceding historical review of the
 
literature has been to point out the diverging points of
 
view of those investigating the subject of morality. With
 
the exception of Freud and Brown, the majority of research
 
has centered around the cognitive aspects of moral judgment
 
and conduct. The majority of writers have assumed that
 
thinking and reasoning are major influences on moral judg
 
ment.„■ ' ' 
Little attention has been given to the emotional side 
of morality. The implication that cognitive maps of moral 
knowledge and social rules are sufficient to explain the 
complexity of moral judgment has been questioned recently. 
Bandura (1969) says, "The findings revealed that exposing 
children to adult models, who expressed moral judgments , 
that ran counter to the children's dominant evaluative 
orientations, was effective in modifying their judgmental 
behavior in the direction of the social influence" (p. 275). 
Of primary interest in this investigation is the 
assumption that moral judgment is determined primarily by 
■' ' ■ . 11 
cognition with little influence attributable to the affec 
tive state. According to Kohlberg (1969), motives and the 
affective components of attitudes are largely shaped and 
changed by the cognitive organization of these attitudes. 
The basis and argument for this approach claims that social 
development is cognitive because any description of shape 
or patterns of a structure of social responses necessarily 
entails some cognitive structure. In this way the cognitive 
maps of moral judgment are firmly established through mat 
uration of the person and, therefore, affective components 
do not have the influence or power to change the existing 
structure. This would suggest that a person's feelings and 
emotions, regardless of how strong the attitudes may be, 
would not alter a person's moral decision making because of 
prior cognitive organization of attitudes. 
The above view has been questioned Tracy and Cross 
(1973) who found influences of affect with respect to Kohl­
berg's stages of moral reasoning. In their study of social 
ization, a dimension of empathic feelings as a function of 
role-taking was definitely associated with moral judgment 
decision making, 
Hogan and Dickstein (1972) found in a study of morality 
and personological correlates that persons whose moral judg 
ments were rated as mature tended to be empathic. 
Although both studies above suggest the possibility of 
higher levels of cognitive organization, how much influence 
12 
the affective coraponents have is still in question. It
 
would seem plausible that empathy could provide the basis
 
for any cognitive reorganization and, therefore, would
 
become instrumental in shaping moral reasoning abilities.
 
Since empathy has received considerable attention in
 
prior morality research, and assuming that it is a strong
 
affective state, this parameter, then, may have an effect
 
on Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning. Hearing about a
 
dilemma as compared to reading about the same moral dilemma
 
should not alter a person's moral judgment according to
 
Kohlberg's cognitive approach. However, if hearing a moral
 
dilemma which is presented dramatically instead of reading
 
the same moral dileisma does alter a person's moral decision
 
making, it would suggest that feelings are as important to
 
moral decision making as thinking and reasoning. Further,
 
if empathy contributes to moral judgment development, then
 
it would seem plausible that higher empathy would be asso
 
ciated with higher morial stages. In their research on
 
empathy, Mehrabian and Epstein (1973) created an empathy
 
scale within the framework that empathic persons can better
 
understand another's problems since their judgment is at
 
the feeling level of maturity. The person's empathic feel
 
ings would enhance his cognitive structure. This would give
 
the person a wider moral base in his judgment of interper
 
sonal problems.
 
The results of Mehrabian and Epstein's (1973) paper
 
13 
indicated a significant difference in empathy between male
 
and female subjects. Therefore, including the difference
 
in empathy between male and female, it would be of research
 
value to investigate the following problem areas.
 
1. Is there a difference in empathy between male and
 
female subjects?
 
2. Is there a difference in empathy between reading
 
and hearing/discussing moral dilemma stories?
 
3. Is there a relationship between moral judgment and
 
empathy?
 
Statement of Research Hypothesis
 
The following research hypotheses were advanced.
 
1. Research hypothesis: There will be a difference
 
in empathy as a function of reading or hearing/discussing
 
a moral dilemma story.
 
2. Research hypothesis: There will be a difference
 
in empathy as a function of sex of subject (male, female).
 
3. Research hypothesis: There will be a significant
 
relationship between degree of empathy and stage of moral
 
reasoning.
 
The null forms of the research hypotheses will be
 
evaluated at the .05 level of significance.
 
METHOD
 
Subjects
 
Two social science classes of 16 female and 16 male
 
students each were selected from a local high school upon
 
the recommendation of the high school instructor. The age
 
range of the students varied between 16 and 18, The male
 
and female students were divided into two experimental
 
groups of 16 male and 16 female each.
 
Apparatus
 
Mehrabian and Epstein's Empathy Scale was used to
 
assign subjects to matched groups. The scale was developed
 
around two areas of emotional responsiveness, aggression and
 
helping behavior. The common element in their instrximent
 
was found to be the heightened responsiveness to anothier's
 
emotional experience. The reliability and validity of this
 
33-item questionnaire is discussed as part of an earlier
 
research paper on helping behavior (Mehrabian and Epstein,
 
1972). (See Appendix A.)
 
The second empathy scale was constructed specifically
 
for use in this study. The scale consisted of a 16—item
 
paper and pencil questionnaire using items from the Mehra
 
bian and Epstein scale but with emphasis directed to the
 
characters in the moral dilemma stories (see Appendix B).
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All responses to the moral dilemma stories were hand
 
written on a standard size paper form.
 
A cassette tape recorder was used to record and play
 
back the dramatized version of each moral dilemma story
 
(see Appendix D and Appendix E).
 
The "read only" moral dilemma stories were typewritten
 
on a standard size paper (see Appendix C).
 
Procedure
 
The experiment was accomplished in six one-hour ses
 
sions, After all subjects were given the first empathy
 
scale (33 items) to establish a hierarchical order of match
 
ing of subjects by two according to high/low degree of
 
empathy/ then the male and female subjects were separated
 
and members of each matched pair were randomly assigned to
 
two groups/ "read only" and "hear only,"
 
In the second session# the "read only" groups of 16
 
male and 16 female subjects were given the Heinz and Joe
 
stories to read in silence. Each subject was asked to write
 
his/her decision and the reason why for both of the moral
 
dilemma stories.
 
In the third session, the "read only" groups of male
 
and female subjects were asked to complete the 16-item
 
empathy questionnaire (Appendix B),
 
The fourth session consisted of the "hear only" groups.
 
Sixteen male and 16 feniale subjects listened to the Heinz
 
■16 
and Joe dramatized moral dilemma stories played on a tape 
recorder. Immediately after the story playback, discussion 
was allowed and encouraged. In a prior pilot study it was 
found that discussion was needed to help the subjects under 
stand the tape recorded stories. Discussion was not required 
for the "read only" groups. After a ten-minute discussion 
period each subject was asked to write his/her response and 
the reason why for both of the moral dilemma stories. 
In the fifth session, the "hear only" groups of male 
and female subjects were asked to complete the 16-item 
empathy questionnaire (see Appendix B), 
The sixth session consisted of debriefing the subjects. 
Each student was given a paper showing his/her moral judg 
ment stage score and empathy score relative to the other 
subjects in the study. All students were informed of the 
results of the experiment. 
Design 
A SPF-2,2 design (Kirk, 1968) was used to analyze the 
data. The between-subject treatment had two levels, male 
and female. The matched-subjects treatment consisted of 
two levels of story presentation: "read only" and "hear 
only." Subjects within groups were matched on the 33-item 
empathy questionnaire before being subjected to the "read 
only" and "hear only" sessions during which the moral 
dilemma stories were presented (see Table 1), 
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Table 1
 
Empathy Matched Subjects Design, SPF-2,2^
 
bl b2.
 
si si
 
-

al
 
-

- ■ al = Male subjects 
sl6 sl6 a2 = Female subjects
 
sl7 sl7 
■ ■ '' ' ' ' ' ■ 
- '
 
a2
 
■ ■ ■ " ■ ■ ■■ 
_
 bl = Read stories
 
s32 s32 b2 = Hear stories
 
Design layout format is from Kirk (1968).
 
A chi-square test was used to determine whether the
 
variables of empathy and moral judgment stage were inde
 
pendent.
 
RESULTS
 
Differences in Empathy with Respect
 
to Male and Female Subjecti"
 
Table 2 presents the results of the analysis of
 
variance concerning differences of empathy between male
 
and female subjects. Source A is significant at the .05
 
level as shown by an F of 5.82, Means and standard
 
deviations for male and female subjects for the 16-item
 
empathy questionnaire are shown in Table 3. As shown
 
by a mean score of 24,4 for female subjects and 15,4 for
 
male subjects, the female subjects scored higher in empathy
 
in both modes of story presentation.
 
Effects of Mode of Story
 
Presentation on Empathy
 
Table 2 presents the results of the analysis of vari
 
ance concerning differences of empathy between modes of story
 
presentation: "read only" and "hear only" of moral dilemma
 
stories. . Source B is significant at the ,05 level as shown
 
by an F of 4,33, Both male and female subjects scored higher
 
in the "hear only" mode as compared to the "read only"
 
presentation. It must be noted that the "hear only" groups
 
discussed the stories after presentation whereas the "read
 
only" groups did not, which could have accounted for some
 
portion of the higher "hear only" scores. The added element
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of discussion was required to help the "hear only" subjects
 
understand the tape recorded versions. However, the experi­
mental interest was not intended to find a difference between
 
"read only" and "hear only" but rather to find a difference
 
in emotional responsiveness between straight reading and
 
a dramatized version of moral dilemma stories, which would
 
elicit emotional responsiveness.
 
Relationship between Empathy and
 
Morai Judgment"stage
 
Table 4 presents the results of the relationship
 
between empathy and moral judgment stage. As shown by the
 
(
 
chi-square significance test scores, empathy and moral judg
 
ment stage are not independent for either males, females,
 
or both sexes combined.
 
An examination of Table 4 indicates that subjects who
 
score higher on empathy also tend to be at a higher moral
 
stage. Conversely, subjects who score low on empathy also
 
tend to be at a lower moral stage.
 
The median was used as the dividing line between low
 
and high of both empathy scores and moral judgment stage
 
scores. The median was used rather than the means because
 
of the large variability of empathy scores and because the
 
full range of scores for moral judgment stage comprised only
 
one through six. Most of the subject's scores of moral
 
judgment stage fell in the twos and threes. There were no
 
sixes and only a few ones.
 
Table 2 
Analysis of Variance of Empathy Scores 
Source SS df MS F 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Between subjects 
Male/female subjects (A) 
Subj. w. groups 
Within subjects 
Mode of story presentation (B) 
AB 
B X subj. w. groups 
7908 
1287 
6621 
7638 
953 
98 
6587 
31 
1 
30 
32 
1 
1 
30 
1287 
221 
953 
98 
220 
(2/3) 5.82* 
(5/7) 4.33* 
(6/7) .45 NS 
8. Total 15546 63 
*£ < .05. 
Isj 
O 
Table 3
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the 16-Item Empathy Questionnaire
 
Sex of Subject
 
Male
 
Female
 
Male and
 
Female
 
Combined
 
Mode of Story Presentation 
Read and Hear 
Read Hear Combined 
M 10.3 20.5 15.4 
S.D, 6.6 13.8 11.8 
N 16 16 32 
M 21.8 27.0 24.4 
S.D. 20.1 15.6 17.9 
N 16 16 32 
M 16.0 23.8 
S.D, 15.8 14.8 
N 32 32 
to
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Two raters were used for the interrater reliability in
 
scoring of both moral dilemmas for each response for all
 
64 subjects. The interrater reliability of scoring the
 
Heinz story with an r of .59 was considerably higher than
 
an r of .20 for the Joe story.
 
Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations of
 
male and female subjects on the matching 33-item empathy
 
questionnaire and Mehrabian and Epstein's 33-item empathy
 
questionnaire.
 
  
Table 4 
Chi-square Frequency Distribution; 
Moral Judgment/Empathy 
( . 
Low 
Moral Stage 
High 
High 
Female 
Male 
Total 
= 
= 
= 
3 
2 
5 
Female =14 
Male = 14 
Total = 28 
33 
Empathy 
Low 
Female =10 
Male = 11 
Total = 21 
Female 
Male 
Total 
=' 5 
= 5 
= 10 
31 
26 38 64 
Subjects N Chi-square 
Male 
Female 
Total 
32 
32 
64 
6.30* 
4.77* 
12.60* 
< .05. 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for the 
33-Item Empathy Questionnaires 
Mean S.D. 
33-Item Empathy Questionnaire Male 34,9 19,9 
(matching) Female 50,3 22,3 
33-1tem Empathy Questionnaire Male 26,0 22,0 
(Mehrabian and Epstein) Female 56,0 21,0 
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DISCUSSION
 
Differences in Empathy with Respect
 
to Male and Ferctale Subjects
 
The results of this experimental study confirm research
 
hypothesis 2; there was a difference in empathy as a function
 
of sex of subject. Higher empathy was evidenced by female
 
subjects in both the "read only" and "hear only" groups. It
 
was anticipated that female subjects would score higher on
 
empathy than male subjects based on the results of the Meh­
rabian and Epstein 33^item empathy questionnaire. This proved
 
to be the case in both the 33-item matching and the'16—item
 
empathy questionnaires used in the study (see Table 5).
 
Even though the 16-item empathy questionnaire was a
 
derivative of the 33-itero Mehrabian and Epstein instrument,
 
the same ratio of difference between male and female sub
 
jects was demonstrated. The higher scoring of empathy of
 
female over male subjects leads to the assumption that
 
females have a greater empathic understanding of interper
 
sonal conflict situations of moral dilemmas than do males.
 
This finding coincides with the conclusion of Mehrabian and
 
Epstein's research.
 
Effects of Story Presentation on Empathy
 
The results of this experimental study confiirm research
 
hypothesis 1; there was a difference in empathy as a function
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of reading or hearing a mor-al dilerraraa story. Higher empathy
 
was evidenced when a dramatized tape recording of the Heinz
 
and Joe story was heard as compared to the same moral dilemma
 
stories read. Both male and female empathy scores were
 
higher in the hearing mode presentation. It was speculated
 
that differences in response of "read only" and "hear only"
 
story presentations would exist because the subjects would
 
exhibit more feeling in their response to a moral dilemma
 
when the stories were presented dramatically.
 
When the conflict situation was presented on paper
 
("read only") and the subject was asked to make a response
 
in writing, it was assumed that he/she would respond intel
 
lectually, primarily using his/her thinking and reasoning
 
powers. On the other hand, when the conflict situation was
 
presented dramatically, it was asstimed that the Subject
 
would respond with an emotional base, primarily using his/
 
her empathic understanding. Apparently, this was the case
 
in this experiment because higher empathy was associated with
 
the "hear only" dramatized tape-recorded moral dilemmas
 
instead of the "read only" moral dilemmas.
 
A question arises whether or not the dramatized tape-

recorded version of the moral dilemma stories was the same
 
as the "read only" presentation. It is obvious that any
 
difference in the basic story theme between the two modes
 
of presentation could account for differences in empathy
 
between the two groups of subjects. Every effort was made
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to duplicate the recorded version as closely as possible to
 
the "read only" version of Kohlberg's moral dilemma stories
 
of Heinz and Joe.
 
A procedural difference did occur between the "read
 
only" and "hear only" groups which was not incorporated into
 
the original design. Discussion of the moral dilemmas by
 
the "hear only" subjects was allowed because it was felt
 
that it would amplify the differences between the two groups
 
in emotional responsiveness to the moral dilemma stories.
 
Also^ in a pilot study it was found that discussion of the
 
stories after presentation was needed to enhance and clarify
 
the tape-recorded version*
 
\ . , ^ ■ ' . , ■ 
Relations^iip between Empathy and
 
Moral Judgment Stage
 
The results of this experimental study confirm research
 
hypothesis 3; there was a relationship between degree of
 
empathy and moral judgment stage. As shown by Table 4, of
 
the combined total scores Of 32 male and 32 female subjects
 
for a total of 64, 28 had high moral Stage and high empathy
 
as compared to 5 with low moral stage and high empathy. It
 
was anticipated that subjects who scored high on moral judg
 
ment (Kohlberg's stages) would also score high on empathy.
 
Conversely, those who scored low on moral judgment stage
 
would also score low on empathy.
 
The median for moral judgment scores was established at
 
2,8; two and below was considered as low moral stage and
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three and above was counted as high moral stage. Even
 
though the median seems to be the best method of determin
 
ing central tendency for this application of the chi-square
 
distribution, it is felt that a more accurate way of deter
 
mining high scores and low scores is needed.
 
One of the problems of this investigation was determin
 
ing moral judgment sthge according to Kohlberg's standard
 
scoring form. Since the Heinz story had many more examples
 
of typical responses than did the Joe story, greater reli
 
ability of interrater judging of the Heinz story was pos
 
sible. Interrater reliability of two judges was significantly
 
better for the Heinz story than for the Joe story. It would
 
appear that a wider range of scoring for the moral judgment
 
stages is needed so that a more accurate dispersion of high
 
scores and low scores can be computed.
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
In summary# this study investigated the relationship
 
of empathy to moral reasoning# sex# and mode of story
 
presentation. A sample size of 64 high school students
 
was used in the experiment. Based on the data from this
 
study# it is concluded that:
 
1. Female subjects scored higher on empathy than did
 
male subjects regardless of mode of story presentation.
 
2. Both male and female subjects scored higher on
 
empathy when hearing moral dilemma stories followed by dis
 
cussion as compared to reading moral dilemma stories.
 
3. A relationship between empathy and level of moral
 
reasoning was evidenced. High empathy and high moral judg
 
ment stage occurred more frequently than did high empathy
 
and low moral judgment stage. Conversely# low empathy and
 
low moral judgment stage occurred more often than did low
 
empathy and high moral judgment stage.
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APPENDIX A
 
33 Item Empathy Questionnaire
 
Disagree"<­
. 4 3 2 1
 
1, 	It makesme sad to see a lonely
 
stranger in a group. 
'
 
2. 	People make too much of the feelings;
 
& sensitivity of animals.
 
3. 	I often find public displays of
 
affection annoying;
 
4. 	I am annoyed by unhappy people who
 
are just sorry for themselves.
 
5. 	I become nervous if others around
 
me seem to be nervous.
 
6, I find it silly for people to cry :.'
 
out of happiness.
 
7, I tend to get emotionally involved
 
with a friend's problems.
 
8, Sometimes the words of a love song
 
can move me deeply.
 
9, 	I tend to lose control when I am
 
bringing bad news to people.
 
10. 	The people around me have a great
 
influence on my moods.
 
11, 	Most foreigners I have met seemed
 
cool & Unemotional.
 
12. 	I would rather be a social worker
 
than work in a job training
 
center.
 
13, I don't get upset just because a
 
friend is acting upset.
 
14, I like to watch people open
 
presents,
 
15. 	Lonely people are probably
 
unfriendly.
 
16, Seeing people cry upsets
 
me.
 
17. 	Some songs make me
 
happy.
 
18. 	I really get involved with the
 
feelings of the characters in a
 
novel.
 
-^Agree
 
+ + + +
 
1 2 3 4
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19. 	I get very angry when I see
 
someone being ill-treated.
 
20, I am able to remain calm even
 
though those around me worry.
 
21, When a friend starts to talk ,
 
about his problems, I try to
 
steer the conversation to some-'
 
thing else.
 
22, Another's laughter is not
 
catching for me.
 
23, 	Sometimes at the movies I am
 
amused by t;he amount of crying
 
& sniffling around irte.
 
24, 	I am able to make decisions with
 
out being influenced by people's
 
feelings.
 
25, 	I cannot continue to feel OK if
 
people around me are depressed.
 
26, It is hard for me to see how
 
some things upset people so much.
 
27, I am very upset when I see an
 
animal in pain.
 
28, Becoming involved in books or
 
movies is a little silly.
 
29, It upsets me to see helpless
 
old people.
 
30, I become more irritated than
 
sympathetic when I see some
 
one's tears.
 
31, I become very involved when I
 
watch a movie.
 
32, I often find that I can remain
 
cool in spite of the excitement'
 
around me.
 
33, Little children sometimes cry
 
for no apparent reason.
 
Disagree-*- -^-Agree
 
- + 	+ + +
 
4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4
 
 APPENDIX B
 
16 Item Empathy Questionnaire
 
Disagree-^ -^Agree
 
■ + + + ■ + 
4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 
1. 	It makes roe sad to think of Heinz
 
in his dileroroa.
 
2. People make too much of the feel­
~ ings & Sensitivity of people like
 
Heinz.
 
3. 	I would have a tendency to get
 
emotionally involved with Joe's
 
problem.
 
8. 	There are times when Heinz
 
problems could move me very
 
deeply.
 
10i Being around Joe with his prob
 
lem would have a great influence
 
on my moods.
 
11, 	Most foreigners I have met like
 
Heinz seemed cool & unemotional.
 
13. 	It doesn't upset me to hear that
 
Joe has a problem.
 
16. 	Seeing Heinz cry would upset
 
me.
 
19. 	I get very angry when I see some
 
one like Joe being ill-treated.
 
24. 	I would be able to make decisions
 
without being influenced by Joe's
 
problem.
 
25. 	It is difficult for me to feel
 
all right when I think about
 
Heinz problem.
 
26. 	It is difficult for me to under
 
stand how Joe's story could
 
upset people so much.
 
28. 	Becoming involved in Joe's prob
 
lems is a little silly.
 
29. 	It upsets me to think of Heinz
 
poor wife? helpless & dying.
 
30, 	I become more irritated than
 
sympathetic when someone like Joe
 
worries about his problem.
 
32. 	With problems like Heinz, I often
 
find that I can remain cool in spit«%
 
of the excitement around me.
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APPENDIX C
 
Moral Dilenmta Stories
 
HEINZ; In Europe, a woman was near death from cancer. One
 
drug might save her life, a iorm of raditun that a druggist
 
in the same town had recently discovered. The druggist was
 
charging $2,000, ten times what the drug cost him to make.
 
The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew
 
to borrow the money, but he could only get together about
 
half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife
 
was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay
 
later. But the druggist said, "No," The husband got
 
desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug
 
for his wife. Should the husband have done that? Why?
 
JOE: Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to
 
camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he
 
saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at
 
his paper route and saved up the $40.00 it cost to go to
 
camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was
 
going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his
 
(father's) friends decided to go on a special fishing trip,
 
and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So
 
he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper
 
route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he
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thought of refusing to give his father the money. Should
 
Joe refuse to give his father the money?
 
APPENDIX D
 
Heinz Script
 
SCRIPT IS TO 	BE READ DRAMATIC
 
NARRATOR: 	 "The following brief dramatic presentation is
 
the story of one man's solution to a moral
 
dilemma.
 
PAUSE
 
NARRATOR: 	 "One day in a small European town, a young lady
 
hailed an older man as he walked up the street."
 
PAUSE
 
YOUNG LADY!	 "Oh, Heinz - waitl I must speak with youI"
 
HEINZ:	 "Hello, my friend. What is it?"
 
YOUNG LADY!	 "Good news for you, I hope. I have heard that
 
the, druggist here in town recently discovered
 
a new drug, a form of Radium that can cure
 
your wife's cancer!"
 
HEINZ:	 "Oh, I hope so -— because it is our last chance.
 
She will surely die unless she can be treated
 
soon."
 
YOUNG LADY;	 "But Heinz, he is charging $2,000 for it, ten
 
times what the drug cost him to make!"
 
HEINZ:	 "I will try to borrow the money and then speak
 
with him. Thank youI"
 
PAUSE
 
NARRATOR: 	 "Hours later, Heinz and the druggist are talk
 
ing at the druggist's store. The druggist is
 
speaking to Heinz."
 
PAUSE
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DRUGGIST!	 "Yes, I have the drug that you want right here
 
in this cabinet and I will sell some to you
 
for $2,000 - cash only!"
 
HEINZ	 "But> I do not have that much money. All that
 
I can borrow is $1,000. Please sell the
 
drug to me cheaper or let me pay later. I beg
 
of you my wife will die if she does not
 
have the drug soon!" '
 
DRUGGIST: 	 "My answer to you is NO! I must have the full
 
$2,000 now!"
 
NARRATOR: 	 "Later - the same night, Heinz returned to the
 
store of the druggist, broke in and stole the
 
drug for his wife.
 
NARRATOR;
 
JOE:
 
FATHER:
 
NARRATOR:
 
FATHER:
 
JOE:
 
FATHER:
 
JOE:
 
APPENDIX E
 
Joe Script
 
SCRIPT TO BE READ DRAMATIC
 
"The scene takes place at the home of Joe, a 14
 
year old boy who is talking with his father,"
 
"I really want to go to camp this summer. Dad!
 
Last year I didn't get to go, remember?"
 
"Yes, I remember. This time I promise! You
 
can go if you save the money for it yourself."
 
"For the next three months, Joe worked at
 
extra jobs besides his paper route and was able
 
to save $40.00 for camp plus a little extra
 
for spending money. The day before he was to
 
leave for camp, his father asked to speak with
 
him."
 
"Joe, I've changed my mind about letting you
 
go to camp. I know I promised, but I need the
 
40 dollars you've saved."
 
"But you promised I could go if I saved the
 
money!"
 
"I know. But there is a special fishing trip
 
that my friends and I have decided to go on
 
and I need your $40.00. Well?"
 
"I really feel like not giving you the money!"
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